Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? PDF
Markus Patrick HessThis book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.
Which goals are epistemic? "Epistemology is the theory of knowledge" What is this doing, for David? Does it entail that, e.g., evaluations of Foley rationality are not epistemic? So, in addition to the knowledge-goal and the truth-goal: the justified-belief-goal is epistemic. Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? - Walter de …
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Epistemic Justification - Internet Encyclopedia of … Some argue that justification is fundamentally aimed at truth, that is, it increases the likelihood that a belief is true. Laurence BonJour writes, “If epistemic justification were not conducive to truth in this way…then epistemic justification would be irrelevant to our main cognitive goal and of dubious worth” (1985: 8). Others argue
Truth - Wikipedia Teleological truth moves itself in the three-step form of dialectical triplicity toward the final goal of perfect, final, absolute truth. According to Hegel, the progression of philosophical truth is a resolution of past oppositions into increasingly more accurate approximations of absolute truth.
Truth as the Primary Goal (whether constructively or not) Presenter: Kurt. David, "Truth as the Epistemic Goal" Maitzen, "Our Errant Epistemic Aim" *DePaul, "Value Monism in Epistemology" *Kvanvig, "Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal" *Elgin, "True Enough" *DePaul, "Value Monism in Epistemology" 3/24. Truth and Degreed Belief. Presenter
Epistemic justification differs in that it has the primary epistemic goal of getting true beliefs; Steup states, “The standard answer is that epistemic justification is linked to truth in a way that moral and prudential justification is not” (Steup 253). In contrast, moral justification has the goal of pursuing the good, and prudential justification has the goal of holding beliefs that may
• „If truth is our primary goal then all other goals have merely instrumental value, insofar as they help to attain that primary goal.“ (S. 102, Mitte) Dabei hat Hess in dieser These das so ungemein wichtige „epistemisch“ unterschlagen, aber sicher dazu gedacht.